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V 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and 
(5) because the Court granted in part the parties' cross-petitions for writ of certiorari to 
the court of appeals. (Add. I.)1 
ISSUES PRESENTED, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
BELOW 
The following two issues are presented for this Court's review: 
1. Did the court of appeals incorrectly affirm the denial of The View's 
summary judgment motion and the grant of MSI/Alta's cross-motion by concluding that 
the Restrictive Covenants governing the Sugarplum development do not apply to Lot 5 of 
the Amended Sugarplum Plat, even though the plain language of the Restrictive 
Covenants applies on its face, creates a covenant running with the land, and is 
incorporated in the parties' deeds? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law, which this Court 
reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the lower court's decision. See, e.g., 
Workman v. Brighton Props., Inc., 1999 UT 30, H 2, 976 P.2d 1209, 1210-11 (summary 
judgment reviewed for correctness); Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, 
Tf 19, 974 P.2d 288, 295 (proper application of law reviewed for correctness). The parties 
seeking to set aside a restrictive covenant must evince clear and convincing evidence to 
meet their burden of proof. See Leaver v. Grose, 563 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1977). In a 
1
 For the Court's convenience, this brief will use the same citation abbreviations as 
Petitioner's Opening Brief, unless otherwise noted. 
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review of summary judgment, this Court "accept[s] the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party." Winegar v. Froerer Corp,, 813 P.2d 104,107 (Utah 
1991). 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below in The View's motion for 
summary judgment and in accompanying legal memoranda filed in support thereof and in 
opposition to MSI/Alta's own motion for summary judgment. (R. 290-312, 458-546.) 
The issue was also briefed and decided in the court of appeals. (Ct. App. Op. fflf 15-29.) 
2. Did the court of appeals correctly reverse the grant of MSI/Alta's summary 
judgment motion by properly concluding there were disputed facts from which a jury 
could find that The View had protectable snow storage rights on Sugarplum Lot 9 that 
were taken by Alta's actions, including the fact that Alta consistently acknowledged the 
existence of such rights in prior proceedings? 
Standard of Review: The review of a summary judgment determination on a 
given record is a question of law reviewed by this Court for correctness. See, e.g., 
Workman, 1999 UT 30, ^  2, 976 P.2d at 1210. 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below in The View's Combined 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 458-
546.) The issue was also briefed and decided in the court of appeals. (Ct. App. Op. ^ 
30-36.) 
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CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The takings claim is governed by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This is an appeal from a decision of the court of appeals reversing the district 
court's summary judgment order in part and affirming it in part. (Ct. App. Op. If 1.) 
The View Condominium Owners Association ("The View") filed suit and 
demanded a jury on December 13, 2000, alleging six causes of action against MSICO, 
L.L.C. ("MSI") and The Town of Alta ("Alta") (sometimes collectively "MSI/Alta"). (R. 
1-13.) The View sought, among other things: (1) to enforce an existing restrictive 
covenant requiring dedication of the Sugarplum Planned Unit Development Lot 5 for 
parking; and (2) to redress the loss of its snow storage rights on Sugarplum Lot 9. (R. 4-
11.) 
Following the denial of Alta's motion to dismiss and The View's motion for 
preliminary injunction (R. 25-27, 138-40, 273-81), The View filed a motion for summary 
judgment on January 4, 2002, seeking a judgment enforcing the restrictive parking 
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covenant on Lot 5. (R. 290-92.) MSI/Alta responded with its own summary judgment 
motion on the same issue and further sought summary judgment regarding The View's 
snow storage rights on Lot 9. (R. 332-35.) 
Following briefing and oral argument, the district court denied The View's 
summary judgment motion and granted MSI/Alta's in an order dated June 12, 2002. 
(Add. 15-20; R. 588-94.) The district court entered a final judgment on August 23, 2002. 
(Add. 13-14; R. 600-01.) The View timely filed a notice of appeal on September 10, 
2002. (R. 609-11.) 
Following briefing and oral argument, the court of appeals issued a published 
opinion on April 8, 2004. View Condominium Owners Ass 'n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2004 UT 
App 104, 90 P.3d 1042 (Add. 2-12). The court of appeals affirmed the district court's 
order granting MSI/Alta's cross-motion for summary judgment and denying The View's 
own motion on the issue of the Lot 5 parking covenant. (Ct. App. Op. f^ 29.) The court 
reversed the district court's order dismissing The View's easement, estoppel, and takings 
2
 MSI/Alta attempts to characterize the outcome of the preliminary injunction motion as 
supporting its position in this appeal. (MSI/Alta Opening Br. at 10-11.) However, the 
preliminary injunction decision is not at issue in this appeal. The district court 
determined preliminary injunctive relief was not needed to maintain the status quo. 
(Add. 24.) The Court expressed no opinion as to the likelihood of success on the parking 
issue and no opinion on the ultimate issues. (Add. 24-25.) The record was subsequently 
more fully developed, with issues presented to the district court on summary judgment 
that are now the subject of this appeal. The View strongly disputes MSI/Alta's 
characterization that The View had "no right or need to park on Lot 5." (MSI/Alta 
Opening Br. at 10.) Those issues are what gave rise to this lawsuit and are integrally 
bound up with the questions of law this Court is called upon to decide. See infra part I. 
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claims on the Lot 9 snow storage issue and remanded for further proceedings. (Opinion 
Vi 32-36.) 
On cross-petitions for writ of certiorari, this Court ordered review of the following 
issues: (1) The View's argument that the court of appeals erred in holding that the 
restrictive parking covenant was terminated merely by plat amendment; and (2) 
MSI/Alta's argument that the court of appeals erred in allowing Alta's termination of the 
snow storage designation to go to trial on a takings theory. (Add. 1.) 
On November 4, 2004, MSI/Alta, as petitioner on the snow storage issue and 
respondent on the parking covenant issue, filed an opening brief briefing both issues. 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review 
The Sugarplum Planned Unit Development comprises approximately 25 acres in 
Alta near the top of Little Cottonwood Canyon. (R. 29, 424, 437.) Sugarplum is divided 
into nine lots. (R. 369.) The View Condominiums are situated on Lot 8. (R. 294, 339.) 
MSI owns Lots 5 and 9. (R. 294, 339.) Both The View and MSI are successors in 
interest to parties that acquired their parcels from the original developer, Sorenson 
Resources Company and/or its related entities ("Sorenson"). (R. 167, 233-35, 340, 417-
18.) 
1. The Restrictive Parking Covenant on Lot 5 
On August 12, 1983, Sorenson recorded a "Master Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions of Sugarplum, a Planned Unit Development, Salt Lake 
County, Utah" (the "Declaration" or "Restrictive Covenants"). (Add. 26-83; R. 359-
302309v.3 <N 
416.) The Restrictive Covenants apply by their terms to the Sugarplum "Project." (Add. 
30 If A, 35 § 1.25; R. 363, 368.) The Sugarplum Project "shall consist of nine Lots" 
(Add. 36 §2.1.2; R. 369): 
Lots 1 through 9, inclusive, as shown on that certain map entitled 
"SUGARPLUM, A PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT" filed 
concurrently herewith in the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, as 
the same may be amended from time to time, and all improvements erected 
thereon. 
(Add. 35 § 1.25; R. 368) (emphasis added). The "map" referred to is: 
that subdivision map or P.U.D. plat entitled "SUGARPLUM, A PLANNED 
UNIT DEVELOPMENT," filed concurrently herewith in the Office of the 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, as the same may be amended from time to 
time, and which is incorporated herein by this reference. 
(Add. 34 § 1.19; R. 367) (emphasis added). 
The Restrictive Covenants provide that "Lot 5 shall be reserved for and improved 
with a parking facility for the owners of Lot 4 and Lots 6-9 and the Units constructed 
thereon, subject to Declarant's [Sorenson's] reservation of the air space rights to Lot 5 as 
described in Section 2.1.3 above." (Add. 42 § 3.1; R. 375.) In Section 2.1.3, Sorenson 
"reserve[d] unto itself, its successors and assigns, the exclusive right to develop, build 
upon, lease, sell and otherwise use the air space above Lot 5." (Add. 36 § 2.1.3; R. 369. 
The Declaration specifically provides that its restrictive covenants run with 
the land: 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby declared that the Project shall be 
held, sold, conveyed, leased, rented, encumbered and used subject to the 
following Declaration as to division, easements, rights, assessments, liens, 
charges, covenants, servitudes, restrictions, limitations, conditions and uses 
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to which the Project may be put, hereby specifying that such Declaration 
shall operate for the mutual benefit of all Owners of the Project and shall 
constitute covenants to run with the land and shall be binding on and for the 
benefit of Declarant, its successors and assigns, the Master Association, its 
successors and assigns and all subsequent Owners of all or any part of the 
Project, together with their grantees, successors, heirs, executors, 
administrators, devisees and assigns, for the benefit of the Project. 
This Declaration shall run with the land, and shall continue in full 
force and effect for a period of fifty (50) years from the date on which this 
Declaration is executed. After that time, this Declaration and all its 
covenants and other provisions shall be automatically extended for 
successive ten (10) year periods unless this Declaration is revoked by an 
instrument executed by Owners of not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the 
Lots and Units in the Project, and recorded in the Office of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder within one year prior to the end of said 50-year period or 
any succeeding 10-year period. 
(Add. 31, 79 § 12.12; R. 364, 412) (emphasis added). 
The Declaration also sets forth specific provisions providing how it may be 
amended: 
Until sale of the first Lot or Unit Declarant shall have the right to 
amend this Declaration. 
After the first sale of a Lot or Unit this Declaration shall be amended 
upon the vote or written assent of a majority of the total voting power of the 
Master Association, and a majority of the total voting power of the Master 
Association other than Declarant; provided, however[,] Declarant shall 
have the sole authority at any time to amend this Declaration, and the Map, 
if necessary, for the purpose of allocating density to Lots owned by 
Declarant or changing the configuration, size or location of Lots owned by 
Declarant, in accordance with Subsections 2.1.2 and 2.1.4 hereof. All 
Owners shall execute any documents necessary to carry out the provisions 
of this Subsection 13.2. 
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An amendment shall become effective when it has received the 
required approvals and the Board has executed, acknowledged and recorded 
in the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, an instrument expressing 
the amendment and certifying that the required approvals were received. 
(Add. 79-80 §§ 13.1, 13.2, 13.4; R. 412-13.) 
On August 12, 1983, Sorenson recorded a Plat of the Sugarplum PUD in the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's Office with nine Lots as prescribed by the Restrictive 
Covenants. (R. 419.) On November 26, 1984, Sorenson recorded an Amended Plat, 
revising the configuration, size, and location of the nine Lots. (R. 420-22, 422 second 
page.) At no time has Sorenson or any successor ever amended the Restrictive 
Covenants that apply to the Amended Plat. (R. 275.) The Amended Plat refers on its 
face to the existing Restrictive Covenants. (R. 420.)3 
Lot 8 was subsequently conveyed to The View and Lot 5 to MSI. Both deeds 
incorporated the unamended Restrictive Covenants containing the parking covenant into 
their legal descriptions. (R. 233-35, 417-18.) MSI's deed conveyed Lot 5 "as the same is 
identified in the [Amended Plat] and in the Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, 
Restrictions of SUGARPLUM, A Planned Unit Development, recorded August 12, 
1983." (R. 234,462) (emphasis added). 
3
 MSI/Alta purports to submit as a (presumably undisputed) material fact that u[w]ith the 
Amended Plat, Sorenson's intent was to amend and supersede the Declaration's provision 
for parking on Lot 5." (MSI/Alta Br. at 5.) This statement of "fact," made without 
record citation, is nothing more than argument that contradicts Utah law and contravenes 
the provisions of the Declaration. See infra part I.A.I (discussing written amendment 
requirements of the Declaration and Utah law governing their construction); Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(7). 
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Shortly before this litigation commenced, MSI settled a land use lawsuit against 
Alta related to the use of its lots. (R. 437-48; see infra part B.2, discussing MSI/Alta 
settlement more fully). Following that settlement, MSI took the position that the 
restrictive parking covenant set forth in the Restrictive Covenants no longer existed on 
Lot 5 because the amendment of the plat had impliedly amended it away; consequently, 
MSI communicated that it intended to develop Lot 5 in a manner inconsistent with the 
Declaration. (R. 312.) The View then commenced this litigation to enforce the 
enumerated parking covenant on Lot 5. 
2. The View's Snow Storage Rights on Lot 9 
Snow removal and storage are important public issues in Alta given its significant 
annual snowfall. (R. 155.) Accordingly, Alta requires snow storage plans from property 
owners before building permits are issued. (R. 538.) 
Before receiving approval for the Sugarplum PUD, Sorenson proposed a snow 
removal plan to Alta. (R. 118.) In February 1985, Sorenson representative Walter J. 
Plumb, III, sent the following letter to Alta: 
The purpose of this letter is to clarify our intent with regard to snow 
storage at the [Sugarplum] project. 
During development of Lots 6 and 8 on the Black Jack Road as part 
of our first one hundred units, snow shall be stored in appropriate areas. 
Should there be any excess snow, it may be stored on Lot 9 as recorded. 
We recognize that storage areas may change as to utilize several 
alternatives (i.e. Snowbird property, Bipass [sic] road, etc.) that exist. Any 
changes shall be submitted at such time as we make applications for 
development in addition to our first one hundred units. 
(R. 431, emphasis added.) 
IfmnQv T 
On March 5, 1985, Alta informed the developer of The View Condominiums it 
had approved Lot 8 for development, subject to approval of a snow storage plan that met 
Alta's requirements for Sugarplum: 
Snow Storage/Removal. With the understanding that adequate snow 
storage/removal has been addressed only for the first 100 units of the 
P.U.D. . . . with substantial storage planned for Lot 9, the revised snow 
storage/removal plan with details on locations, equipment and time 
constraints, must be approved and signed off by Russ Harmer. Said plan 
will then be attached as a condition to the [Conditional Use Permit]. 
(R. 514.) 
On April 27, 1985, snow storage consultant Russ Harmer - and consequently Alta 
- approved the snow removal plan, designating Lot 9 as overflow snow storage for The 
View. (R. 517-18.) Since 1985, The View has continuously used Lot 9 for snow storage 
pursuant to these approvals and understandings. (R. 523, 525.) 
In 1988, Sorenson filed suit against Mr. Plumb and others ("the Sorenson/Plumb 
Action"), alleging that Mr. Plumb had fraudulently failed to disclose to Sorenson (1) that 
he had granted the use of Lot 9 for Sugarplum development snow storage; (2) that 
"substantial snow storage" was planned for Lot 9; and (3) that Alta would not approve 
development of Lot 9 because it was being used for snow storage and there was no other 
storage available in the vicinity. (R. 526-30.) In a subsequent settlement of the 
Sorenson/Plumb Action, Mr. Plumb agreed to "cooperate fully with and assist Sorenson 
with the removal of the snow storage designation of Lot 9, at no charge." (R. 533.) 
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Sorenson deeded Lot 9 to MSI, an affiliated company, two days after execution of the 
Sorenson/Plumb settlement agreement. (R. 233-35, 531.) 
In September 1996, MSI filed suit against Alta ("the MSI/Alta Action"), alleging 
causes of action based, among other things, on Alta's refusal to allow MSI to develop Lot 
9. (R. 537-38.) In a letter dated November 17, 1998, Alta advised The View: 
The Town of Alta has been sued by MSI, Inc . . . . concerning zoning 
of land near "Lot 8" of the Sugarplum P.U.D., known as the "View.55 
Plaintiff MSI, Inc. claims ownership of "Lot 9" of the Sugarplum P.U.D. 
Be advised that "Lot 9" was designated by the developers of "The 
View55 as the snow storage area for "Lot 8.55 The Town granted 
construction approvals for The View based upon a snow storage plan 
designating "Lot 955 to receive snow from "Lot 8.55 
MSI is taking the position in the litigation against the Town that 
"Lot 955 has not been validly designated as snow storage for snow removed 
from "Lot 855, The View. If MSI succeeds in its claim that The View's 
snow storage plan is invalid insofar as it designates "Lot 955 to receive snow 
from "Lot 8,55 such a result would have major implications for The View 
home owners. 
Snow storage is a life-safety issue in Alta. The Town has no choice 
but to require snow not be pushed into streets or impair emergency access 
or traffic. If The View Condominium Owner's Association were to lose its 
ability to store snow on sites approved in its snow storage plan, the Town 
would have little choice but to take legal action to protect the public safety 
and welfare. That action might even include an injunction precluding 
occupancy of The View or portions thereof during snow periods. Of 
course, the Town of Alta wants to avoid such a drastic result. 
The Town vigorously disputes MSFs allegations that "Lot 955 is not 
validly dedicated as snow storage for "Lot 8,55 The View. 
*rmnov -\ 
We advise the View Home Owner's Association of the situation in 
the spirit of full disclosure since your rights could be affected if MSI 
succeeds in what the Town considers a specious claim. 
(R. 541-42, emphasis added) 
In the MSI/Alta Action, Alta filed a summary judgment motion arguing Lot 9 was 
indisputably designated for snow storage: 
MSI cannot deny that its predecessor [Sorenson] sold Lot 9 to MSI 
knowing that Lot 9 had been designated as snow storage area for snow 
removed from Lots 6 and 8 in the P.U.D.. . . Because Lot 9 was 
designated in 1985 as snow storage for Lots 6 and 8 by MSFs predecessor, 
as a matter of law, Alta's zoning regulations have not inversely condemned 
or damaged MSI interests in any way. Any claims relating to Lot 9 should 
be dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law. MSI may have a remedy 
against its predecessor in interest. 
(R. 538, emphasis added) 
In the MSI/Alta Action, Alta Mayor William H. Levitt testified in a deposition that 
Lot 9 was committed for snow storage: "The only thing Fm aware of is Lot 9 was 
dedicated to snow storage by Walt Plumb in agreement with the planning commission 
and with the technical committee." (R. 536.) 
In the MSI/Alta Action, Mr. Plumb admitted he was still duty bound to assist in 
removing the snow storage designation of Lot 9 at no charge. (R. 540.) 
On November 10, 1999, Alta Town Manager John Guldner testified at a hearing 
before the Alta Town Council that Lot 9 remained dedicated for snow storage: 
In 1985, when The View was permitted, and the remainder of The Village, 
probably about the last third of Sugarplum Village on Lots 6 and 7, The 
View on Lot 8, Lot 9 was designated and given up as snow removal and 
snow storage in order for The View and The Village to be completed. That 
still stands. It has never been recorded, but it is part of a conditional use 
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permit that allowed building permits that allowed the construction of those 
buildings. It is in open record. It is in the Planning Commission's 
documents. 
(R. 510, emphasis added.) 
Legal counsel for Alta, Mr. Barney Gesas, noted at that same hearing that 
Sorenson had sued Mr. Plumb for fraud in the Sorenson/Plumb Action "because of a 
dedication or reservation of Lot 9 for snow removal" and argued that MSFs predecessor 
"knew there was a problem on these lots as of 1988." (R. 512-13.) 
The dedication of Lot 9 for snow storage was confirmed by Alta in Resolution No. 
1999-PC-R-l: 
Snow storage is a major life-safety and road traffic issue everywhere 
in Alta because of the extreme snowfall. The Commission notes that prior 
approvals given to the Sugarplum P.U.D. developers were conditioned 
upon adequate snow removal and storage plans. Some of the Sugarplum 
P.U.D. snow storage plans approved the storage of snow on what is now 
vacant land in the Sugarplum P.U.D. For example, as a condition of 
approval for the development of Lots 6, 7 and 8, Lot 9 was committed for 
snow storage by the developer until such time as other adequate snow 
storage areas are provided on-site and without crossing the By-Pass Road. 
(R. 506-07.) 
MSI and Alta settled the MSI/Alta Action on November 9, 2000. (R. 437-48, 37-
50.) The View was not a party to MSI/Alta's Definitive Settlement and Development 
Agreement. (R. 448.) As part of the settlement, Alta and MSI purported to remove the 
designation of Lot 9 for The View's snow storage. (R. 441.) Alta agreed that "[s]uch 
termination and elimination of storage on Lot 9 is effective without any other consent, 
authorization or action by Alta." (R. 441.) However, MSI and Alta expressly anticipated 
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that The View would seek to enforce its snow storage rights on Lot 9 (as well as its 
parking rights on Lot 5). (R. 444.) Accordingly, MSI and Alta agreed that MSI would 
defend and indemnify Alta from "assertions or claims that may be brought by owners of 
units in Lots 6, 7 or 8 of the Sugarplum PUD ('the View' and the 'Village') concerning a 
prior snow storage designation of Lot 9, concerning any road easements and an 
identification of Lot 5 for parking." (R. 444.) 
Consistent with the terms of the Definitive Settlement and Development 
Agreement terminating the MSI/Alta Action, MSI and Alta have now taken the position 
The View lost any snow storage rights on Lot 9 - without the need for Alta or MSI to 
compensate The View for the loss. MSI communicated its intention to develop Lot 9 in a 
manner inconsistent with The View's rights. (R. 312.) The View then commenced this 
litigation to redress its lost snow storage rights on Lot 9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the district 
court's order denying The View's motion for summary judgment and granting 
MSI/Alta's cross-motion. 
First, summary judgment against The View should be reversed. The Restrictive 
Covenants specifically encumber Lot 5 of the Amended Plat with a parking covenant in 
favor of Lot 8. The plain language of the Restrictive Covenants applies by its terms to 
"Lot 5" on the recorded Plat as the Plat may be amended from time to time. This 
encumbrance is expressly designated as a covenant that runs with the land. Under 
302309v.3 14 
governing law, it is a right enforceable by The View according to its terms. Moreover, 
the Restrictive Covenants and the Amended Plat are specifically referenced and 
incorporated by reference in the deeds conveying property to both MSI and The View. 
As a matter of law, the Restrictive Covenants apply to Lot 5 of the Amended Plat as a 
covenant running with the land and should be enforced in favor of The View. Summary 
judgment against The View was therefore inappropriately granted. 
For these same reasons, summary judgment in favor of MSI/Alta was improperly 
granted. MSI/Alta's cross-motion should also have been denied on its own terms. The 
Court treats cross-motions independently and will deny a cross-motion if the 
requirements of Rule 56 have not been met. Here, significant genuine issues of material 
fact preclude the entry of summary judgment on the legal theories advanced by MSI/Alta. 
In particular, Utah law clearly holds that summary judgment is inappropriate against an 
owner of property when the judgment contradicts presumptively valid recitals in deeds. 
Additionally, MSI/Alta's cross-motion is based heavily on the testimony of Walter J. 
Plumb, whose credibility is suspect and whose testimony may be rejected by a fact finder 
at trial. Moreover, it is clear that the Restrictive Covenants were never amended in the 
manner provided in the Restrictive Covenants themselves. These and other facts 
identified by The View in opposition to MSI/Alta's cross-motion for summary judgment 
render the district court's granting of that motion incorrect as a matter of law. The court 
of appeals failed to correct that error. This Court should reverse and, in the event it does 
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not grant The View's own summary judgment motion, remand the case for resolution by 
a fact finder. 
The court of appeals correctly reversed the district court's order granting 
MSI/Alta's summary judgment motion dismissing The View's takings claim based on 
evisceration of its snow storage rights on Lot 9. On remand, the district court will decide 
The View's easement and estoppel claims, which are not at issue here. Such claims, if 
proven, give rise to protectable property interests under the takings clause. The record is 
peppered with facts showing a snow storage right in favor of The View on Lot 9. Indeed, 
approvals were given to develop The View based explicitly on using Lot 9 for snow 
storage. Moreover, MSI's predecessor (Sorenson) and Alta have both consistently 
admitted the existence of such rights. In two separate lawsuits, and in numerous other 
instances, Sorenson and Alta each independently took the position that such rights 
existed. Alta went so far as to allege that any contrary claim was "specious." The View 
has relied on the snow storage right for more than 15 years. Given this record, a jury 
could easily find that snow storage rights existed in favor of The View on Lot 9 and that 
MSI/Alta's actions terminating that designation affected rights held by The View. Alta's 
actions have deprived The View of access to Lot 9. Accordingly, the court of appeals 
properly reversed dismissal of The View's takings claim. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
DECISION AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE VIEW'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE GRANT OF MSI/ALTA'S CROSS-
MOTION. 
A, The Court of Appeals Erred in Affirming Denial of The View's 
Summary Judgment Motion. 
The court of appeals erred in refusing to enforce the Restrictive Covenants on Lot 
5. "A restrictive covenant cannot be set aside in the absence of clear and convincing 
evidence. And where covenants are duly executed and recorded, the law gives an 
interested party the right to enforce their terms." Leaver v. Grose, 563 P.2d 773, 775 
(Utah 1977) (emphasis added). 
The View is entitled to enforce the Restrictive Covenants according to their terms 
for three main reasons: (1) the plain language of the Restrictive Covenants applies by its 
terms to Lot 5 of the Amended Plat; (2) the Restrictive Covenants unequivocally run with 
the land; and (3) the Restrictive Covenants are specifically incorporated by reference in 
the parties' conveyances. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
1. The Plain Language of the Restrictive Covenants Applies to Lot 
5 of the Amended Plat. 
"Restrictive covenants that run with the land and encumber subdivision lots form a 
contract between subdivision property owners as a whole and individual lot owners; 
therefore, interpretation of the covenants is governed by the same rules of construction as 
those used to interpret contracts." Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, U 11, 998 P.2d 807, 
810-11 (collecting citations). Unambiguous contracts are construed as a matter of law 
and enforced as written. See id. ^ } 11, 998 P.2d at 811. Furthermore, the Court construes 
the contract to harmonize and give effect to all of its provisions. See Central Florida 
Investments v. ParkwestAssocs., 2002 UT 3, ^  12, 40 P.3d 599, 605/ Consequently, this 
Court should enforce the intent of the parties as expressed in the plain language of the 
Restrictive Covenants. 
The Restrictive Covenants provide that "Lot 5 shall be reserved for and improved 
with a parking facility for the owners of . . . Lots 6-9 and the Units constructed thereon." 
(Add. 42 § 3.1; R. 375.) The Restrictive Covenants expressly apply to "Lots 1-9, 
inclusive, as shown on that certain map entitled 'SUGARPLUM, A PLANNED UNIT 
DEVELOPMENT' . . . as the same may be amended from time to time, and all 
improvements erected thereon." (Add. 35 § 1.25; R. 368) (emphasis added). The plain 
language of the Restrictive Covenants therefore applies the parking covenant to Lot 5 of 
the Amended Plat. 
The Restrictive Covenants clearly provide that the Plat - the "Map" - is a fluid 
document subject to amendment. (Add. 34 § 1.19; R. 367.) There is no dispute that 
Sorenson amended the Plat. But the Restrictive Covenants are not impliedly amended 
thereby. To the contrary, as shown more fully below, the case law authority holds that 
restrictive covenants are not impliedly amended by the mere amendment of the plat. If 
Sorenson had desired to limit the parking restriction only to specific land within the PUD, 
it could easily have described that land with a more particularized, unchangeable 
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description. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,198 (Utah 
1991) (if parties had intended a land use restriction in their detailed contract, they could 
have done so expressly). There is no metes and bounds language in the Restrictive 
Covenants that encumbers only a specifically defined legal description with the Lot 5 
parking covenant. Instead, the Restrictive Covenants apply unequivocally by their own 
terms to Lot 5 of the plat as it may be amended. (Add. 42 § 3.1, 36 § 2.1.2; R. 375, 369.) 
In addition, the Restrictive Covenants have specific provisions for their 
amendment which were never invoked. There is no dispute that the Restrictive 
Covenants themselves were never amended in the manner contemplated in the document 
to effectuate a valid substantive amendment. Section 13 allows amendment of the 
substance of the Restrictive Covenants only by specified majority procedures never used. 
(Add. 79-80; R. 412-13.) 
Section 13.2 of the Restrictive Covenants did, however, allow Sorenson "to amend 
this Declaration, and the Map, if necessary, for the purpose of allocating density, size or 
location of Lots owned by Declarant. . . ." (Add. 79 § 13.2; R. 412) (emphasis added). 
By bifurcating the amendment process into unilateral and bilateral procedures, the 
Declaration specifically contemplates that substantive restrictions such as the parking 
covenant will continue in force even if the density, size, or location of the lots are 
changed by amending the Plat. {See also Add. 36 § 2.1.2; R. 369, allowing changes to 
the "number, size or location of any L o t . . . by a modification of the Map"). 
302309v.3 10 
Sorenson made precisely these modifications when it amended its Plat. But it also 
indisputably did not amend the underlying Restrictive Covenants that set forth the use 
restrictions applying to the Amended Plat. (Add. 42, 79-80; R. 375, 412-13.) Neither 
Section 13.2 nor Section 2.1.2 nor any other provision authorizes substantive 
amendments to the Restrictive Covenants by modifications to the Map alone. The 
contractual authority to amend the Restrictive Covenants simply does not include an 
extra-contractual right of the type allowed by the court below.4 
This Court rejected just such an "implied amendment" theory in Dansie v. Hi-
Country Estates Homeowners Ass yn, 1999 UT 62, 987 P.2d 30. A homeowners 
association sought to impose restrictive covenants on an adjoining landowner, Dansie, 
arguing the developer intended such restrictions would apply to subsequent development 
phases. This Court, construing the plain language of the covenants and the deeds, 
rejected that argument. "While it may well have been the intent of the developers to 
impose the covenants on additional phases of the Subdivision which might be developed 
later, that was never done by a written instrument." Id. % 18, 987 P.2d at 34. The Court 
refused to depart from the "long-standing, well-accepted requirement that covenants are 
4
 MSI/Alta's position amounts to an argument that changes to "density," "size," 
"location," or "number" of lots means changes to other underlying substantive rights not 
so enumerated, such as "parking rights" or other restrictive covenants arising in favor of 
other lots. Indeed, MSI/Alta unabashedly argues, based on the "density" provisions, that 
Sorenson was authorized to change the "use" designated in favor of The View's Lot 8. 
(MSI/Alta Opening Br. at 26-27.) Such an interpretation would render the language of 
the Declaration meaningless. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 
P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991) (declining to give credence to implied restriction argument at 
odds with the language of the contract). 
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to be embodied in a written instrument bearing the covenantor's signature." Id. f 25 , 987 
P.2d at 36 (citing 9 RichardR. Powell on Real Property § 60.03 (1998)). Because the 
writing required to change the scope of the restrictive covenants did not appear of record, 
any other evidence of intent was irrelevant and the restrictive covenants and relevant 
deeds would be enforced according to their plain terms. Id. Ylf 14, 18-25, 987 P.2d at 33-
36. 
The underlying principles of Dans ie are important in the instant case. The written 
Restrictive Covenants govern their application to Lot 5. Regardless of the developer's 
unexpressed intent ever to alter the covenants, if indeed that were the case, no such 
amendment was ever made and recorded by a writing required by the Restrictive 
Covenants. Mere after-the-fact testimony from interested parties clearly is not enough. 
The Court reached a similar holding in St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). The developer argued that the agreements in question 
contained an implied covenant prohibiting the hospital from proceeding with construction 
of a building. This Court disagreed. Even when expressly stated, restrictive covenants 
are strictly construed. Id. at 198. "As a general rule, "implied covenants are not favored 
in the law." Id. A restrictive covenant may arise by implication only "[u]nder certain 
extreme circumstances." Id. "In order for a restrictive covenant to be implied, the 
support for it must be 'plain and unmistakable' or it must be 'necessary' as a matter of 
law." Id. (citing 20 Am Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions § 173 (1965)). 
This Court held "there is no plain and unmistakable language in the relevant contracts 
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which would support the restrictive covenant the development company seeks to have us 
imply." Id. "Further, there is no legal necessity to imply restrictive covenant to 
effectuate the intent of the parties." Id. 
The contracts are detailed and sophisticated. There is no indication that the 
parties intended to include a restriction on the hospital's right to build on its 
own property. If that is what they intended, they could have done so 
expressly. 
Id. 
Case law from other jurisdictions provides fundamental restrictive covenant 
principles that likewise apply here. In Claremont Property Owners Ass *n v. Gilboy, 542 
S.E.2d 324 (N.C. App. 2001), the court identified two bedrock principles. See id. at 328 
(analyzing Ingle v. Stubbins, 82 S.E.2d 388 (N.C. 1954), and Callaham v. Arenson, 80 
S.E.2d 619 (N.C. 1954)). First, servitudes imposed by restrictive covenants attach at the 
moment the subdivision becomes subject to the covenants, which "may occur upon the 
filing of a new plat of lots if the plat is intended to be subject to covenants already in 
existence." Id. Second, "the property may be combined or re-subdivided into different 
lots for purposes of ownership or convenience, but, absent a provision in the covenants to 
the contrary, the property must always conform to the servitudes created by the covenants 
as they originally attached to the property." Id. (emphasis added). Each of these 
principles applies here. 
First, the servitudes imposed by the Restrictive Covenants attached to the 
Amended Plat at the time it was recorded. The Amended Plat itself evidences the 
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intention it was to be subject to the existing Restrictive Covenants as it specifically refers 
to the Restrictive Covenants. (R. 420.) Second, the location and size of the lots were 
reconfigured, but a specific provision in the Restrictive Covenants provided the 
covenants would apply to the Plat "as amended." (Add. 35 § 1.25; R. 368.) 
Consequently, the Restrictive Covenants apply by their own terms to the Amended Plat. 
Claremonfs ultimate holding is remarkably on point. Subdivision developers 
(akin to Sorenson) recorded restrictive covenants running with the land. A subsequent 
purchaser (akin to MSI) argued that the developer's recording of an amended plat that 
combined two lots into one effectively amended the restrictive covenants. See id. at 325. 
The court rejected this argument. See id. at 327. 
"These servitudes . . . are usually imposed by restrictive covenants between 
the developer and the initial purchasers and become seated in the chain of 
title . . . thus fixing it so each lot in a legal sense owes to all the rest of the 
lots in the subdivision the burden of observing the covenant, and each of 
the rest of the lots is invested with the benefits imposed by the burdens." 
Id. (quoting Craven County v. Trust Co., 75 S.E.2d 620, 628 (N.C. 1953)). The court 
concluded that "the act of combining Lots 109 and 110 to form Lot 120 did not alter or 
negate the real covenants" governing the lots. Id. at 328; see also McCorquodale v. 
Keyton, 63 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1953) (enforcing recorded plat dedicating property as park 
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and holding that surrounding lot owners acquired a private easement in such dedication 
upon purchase of their lots).5 
The court of appeals' decision in the instant case misapprehends the law of 
restrictive covenants, an error this Court should not replicate. The court of appeals 
effectively held that amending the Sugarplum Plat impliedly amended the Restrictive 
Covenants. This argument contravenes the express provisions of the Declaration and is 
rejected by the case law. See, e.g.,Dansie v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 
1999 UT 62, 987 P.2d 30 (rejecting evidence of intent with respect to restrictive 
covenants if not expressed in written covenants or deeds themselves); see also Richards 
v. Abbottsford Homeowners Ass % 809 S.W.2d 193 (Tenn. App. 1990) (holding 
declaration of covenants applied to amended plat) (cited in MSI/Alta Br. at 27-28). 
Sorenson could not impliedly supersede the Restrictive Covenants by simply revising the 
Sugarplum Plat. Indeed, this analysis is exactly backwards: the Restrictive Covenants 
apply by their terms to all Amended Plats. (Add. 34 § 1.19, 35 § 1.25; R. 367-68.)6 
5
 The Claremont court based its decision squarely on the conclusion that the affirmative 
obligation in question was "clearly a real covenant that runs with the land." 542 S.E.2d 
at 327; see also infra part I.A.2 (discussing covenants that run with the land). The court 
further noted in dicta that, in the absence of a provision in the covenants to the contrary, 
restrictive covenants in a subdivision that run with the land may be repealed only by a 
release or agreement executed by all of the property owners in the subdivision. See id. at 
326 (citing Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Prop. Owners Ass Vz, 375 S.E.2d 905, 908 
(N.C. 1989)). While this issue ultimately was not before the court in Claremont, it would 
have formed an independent basis for enforcing the restrictive covenants, as it does here. 
6
 A party analyzing the recorded Restrictive Covenants would have no way of knowing 
that they had been "impliedly" amended. Public policy militates against reaching such a 
conclusion in this jurisdiction. 
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In sum, the plain language of the Restrictive Covenants demonstrates the error in 
the court of appeals' decision. This Court enforces plain language because important 
rights flow from it and litigants rely on it. The Court should do so here. 
2. The Lot 5 Parking Covenant Unequivocally Runs with the Land. 
The covenant reserving the use of Lot 5 for parking in favor of Lot 8 is a real 
covenant that runs with the land. "A covenant that runs with the land must have the 
following characteristics: (1) the covenant must 'touch and concern5 the land; (2) the 
covenanting parties must intend the covenant to run with the land; and (3) there must be 
privity of estate." Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 622-23 
(Utah 1989); see also Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177, 183 (N.C. 1992) (same). The 
covenant must also satisfy the statute of frauds with a writing. See Flying Diamond, 776 
P.2d at 629. 
In the proceedings below, MSI did not dispute that the parking covenant on Lot 5 
"touched and concerned" the land; nor did it dispute the parties had the requisite privity 
of estate (or a writing). (R. 338A-52.) Rather, MSI argued there was n o intention the 
restrictive parking covenant was to apply to the Amended Plat. (R. 344-52, 356-57.) The 
courts below agreed. (Add. 7-9, 15-19; R. 589-92.) Under this Court's precedents, that 
was legal error. 
This Court has unequivocally held that "[a]n express statement in the document 
creating the covenant that the parties intend to create a covenant running with the land is 
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usually dispositive of the intent issue." Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 627. Looking to the 
language of the Restrictive Covenants, there is no question as to the intent of the parties: 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby declared tha t . . . such Declaration shall 
operate for the mutual benefit of all Owners of the Project and shall 
constitute covenants to run with the land and shall be binding on and for the 
benefit of Declarant, its successors and assigns, the Master Association, its 
successors and assigns and all subsequent Owners of all or any part of the 
Project, together with their grantees, successors, heirs, executors, 
administrators, devisees, and assigns, for the benefit of the Project. 
This Declaration shall run with the land 
(Add. 31, 79 § 12.12; R. 364, 412) (emphasis added). As a matter of law, the parties 
intended to have the Restrictive Covenants run with the land. 
The Flying Diamond opinion is instructive as to how such rights are enforced in 
the Utah courts. Newton, an owner of surface rights, purported to transfer to a third 
party, Bass, one-half of a contractual right to a mineral production payment. The 
production payment obligation was expressly designated in a writing as a covenant 
running with the surface ownership. Newton then sold its entire surface rights to Flying 
Diamond. See 776 P.2d at 620-21. This Court concluded the payment obligation was a 
covenant that ran with the land. See id. at 622-29. Consequently, the court enforced the 
covenant by its plain terms, giving Flying Diamond the sole right to the production 
payment - despite Newton's purporting to transfer the payment obligation independently 
of the land and for consideration. See id. at 630. The court reached its ruling even 
though Flying Diamond had clearly bargained only for a one-half interest in Newton's 
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remaining production payment rights. See id. Notwithstanding these facts, the 
unequivocal language of the covenant running with the land vested the production 
payment rights in Flying Diamond by operation of law. See id. at 630. 
Applying the principles of the Flying Diamond decision, this Court should hold 
that the restrictive parking covenant on Lot 5 runs with the land. The Restrictive 
Covenants expressly say so, giving The View the right to enforce their violation by MSI. 
See id;Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, If 21, 998 P.2d 807, 813; Leaver v. Grose, 563 
P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1977). This conclusion is independently dispositive of the Lot 5 
issue. As Flying Diamond illustrates, whatever else the parties may have subjectively 
thought or done about this obligation does nothing to affect the analysis. Whether the 
parties bargained for or believed something different is irrelevant. As the obligation 
continues to exist, it should be enforced in favor of The View if land rights and case law 
precedent are to be respected in this state. 
3. The Restrictive Covenants Are Specifically Incorporated by 
Reference in the Lot 5 and Lot 8 Deeds to MSI and The View. 
"[Restrictive covenants are a common method of effectuating private residential 
development schemes. Property owners who purchase land in such developments have a 
right to enforce such covenants against other owners who violate them." Swenson, 2000 
7
 In the court of appeals, MSI/Alta waived any argument that the covenant in question did 
not run with the land. (See The View Reply Br. in Ct App. at 17-18; MSI/Alta Opp. Br. 
in Ct. App.) The court of appeals erred in ruling in MSI/Alta's favor under these 
circumstances. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) ("It is well 
established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has 
failed to adequately brief."); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), 24(b). 
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UT 16,1f 21, 998 P.2d at 813 (collecting citations); see also Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 
652 (Utah App. 1995) (restrictive covenants generally enforceable). 
The deeds giving Lot 8 to The View and Lot 5 to MSI incorporate the Restrictive 
Covenants by reference into their legal descriptions. (R. 233-35, 417-18.) Thus, MSI 
and The View both had actual as well as constructive notice of the Restrictive Covenants 
on Lot 5 of the Amended Plat - including the parking covenant - at the time they 
acquired their property rights. Moreover, The Amended Plat makes specific reference to 
the existing Restrictive Covenants - verifying that the terms of the Restrictive Covenants 
continue to apply. (R. 420.) Thus, the Restrictive Covenants apply to Lot 5 as a matter 
of law - by their own terms and as expressed in the relevant deeds. See Dansie, 1999 UT 
62, Tflj 14, 18-25, 987 P.2d at 33-36 (enforcing restrictions referenced in conveyance 
deeds).8 
Summary judgment against The View was especially inappropriate given these 
facts. This Court has expressly held that recitals in deeds are presumptively valid, 
precluding summary judgment against an owner of deeded property on a theory 
contradicting such recitals. See Judkins v. Toone, 492 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1972). In the 
In the district court, The View demonstrated that the deeds incorporated the Restrictive 
Covenants and referred to both the Amended Plat and the Declaration. (R. 462, 498-
502.) The district court nevertheless overlooked this evidence in holding that The View 
"cited to no writing, other than the Master Declaration, with respect to its claims of a 
'parking right' on Lot 5." (Add. 17; R. 590.) The court of appeals failed to correct this 
error. 
302309v.3 28 
instant case, the recorded recitals preclude the summary judgment conclusion reached by 
the court below. 
In short, this Court should give effect to the plain language of the Restrictive 
Covenants, which run with the land, and the deeds incorporating them. The court of 
appeals erred in refusing to do so. Thus, the lower court's decision should be reversed 
and a summary judgment ordered entered in favor of The View. 
B. There was Substantial Record Evidence Presented to the Court that, at 
a Minimum, Created a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Precluding 
Summary Judgment for MSI/Alta. 
1. At the Very Least, The View's Evidence Creates Disputed Issues 
of Fact 
For all the reasons just enumerated, the court of appeals also erred in affirming the 
grant of MSI/Alta's own summary judgment motion on the Lot 5 issue. Because The 
View itself was entitled to summary judgment, MSI/Alta's cross-motion should have 
been denied. Moreover, even if The View had not made a sufficient legal showing that it 
was entitled to summary judgment (which it did), summary judgment still should have 
been denied to MSI/Alta. 
When cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, the Court need not 
necessarily deny one and grant the other. Rather, each motion must be examined on its 
own merits and a proper showing made under Rule 56 to merit the granting of summary 
judgment. See Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981). 
"In effect, each cross-movant implicitly contends that it is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, but that if the court determines otherwise, factual disputes exist which 
preclude judgment as a matter of law in favor of the other side." Wy calls v. Guardian 
Title, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah App. 1989). 
In this case, disputed issues of material fact precluded granting MSI/Alta's cross-
motion for summary judgment. MSI/Alta's motion was based on a different statement of 
material facts than The View's and those facts were disputed by The View. (R. 294-95, 
339-42, 459-63.) The disputed facts that appear of record include the following: 
• MSI, through counsel, represented to the Alta Town Council that the alterations in 
the Amended Plat recorded on November 26, 1984, were "minor" and that the 
"units allocated are essentially the same." (R. 504.) In this litigation, however, 
MSI has stated as a statement of undisputed fact that Lots 5 and 8 were 
"drastically changed" and "significantly alter[ed]" by the Amended Plat. (R. 341, 
462; MSI/Alta Opening Br. at 4.) 
• It is untrue that Lots 5 and 8 "no longer exist" after the amendment of the Plat, as 
alleged by MSI/Alta in its statement of material facts. (R. 341,462.) The 
unamended Declaration anticipated nine Lots in Sugarplum. (Add. 36 § 2.1.2; R. 
369.) The Amended Plat contained Lots 1 through 9, as called for by the plain 
language of the Declaration. (Add. 86-87; R. 420.) 
• Walter Plumb's testimony, relied on by the district court as "evidence of the 
developer's and grantor's intent," may be rejected by the finder of fact on 
credibility grounds - given his underlying bias and written agreement to help 
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Sorenson (MSI's predecessor and a related entity) develop the property in a 
manner inconsistent with The View's asserted rights in exchange for a release of 
fraud claims against him. (Add. 17-18, R. 590-91, 526-33.)9 
• The Restrictive Covenants apply by their terms to all amended plats, and thus 
continued in effect despite the recording of an Amended Plat. (R. 367, 368.) 
• The Amended Plat specifically referred to the Restrictive Covenants, evidencing 
their continued viability. (R. 420.) 
• The recorded Restrictive Covenants are specifically incorporated by reference into 
the description of Lot 5 contained in MSI's deed. (R. 234,417-18, 462.) 
• The only express references to Lot 5 in the body of the Restrictive Covenants are 
in Section 3.1 (use restrictions on individual lots) and Section 2.13 (reservation of 
air space above Lot 5). (Add. 36, 42; R. 369, 375.) 
• The Restrictive Covenants were never amended as provided in the Restrictive 
Covenants themselves and thus are the controlling provisions. (R. 412-13,461.) 
9
 MSI/Alta points to testimony similar to Mr. Plumb's from Russell Watts, which likewise 
falls outside the four corners of the governing documents and contradicts their import. 
(MSI/Alta Opening Br. at 6, 7; Add. 100-02; R. 579-81.) Watts' affidavit was submitted 
to the district court for the first time with MSI/Alta's final reply memorandum below, 
giving The View no chance either to respond to it or to develop appropriate investigative 
discovery. (R. 579-81.) The courts below properly declined to rely on this affidavit in 
rendering their decisions. (Add. 17-18; R. 590-91; Ct. App. Op., Add. 2-12.) This Court 
should do the same. See also supra part I.A.I (discussing Flying Diamond's holding that 
subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant in construing covenants running with the 
land). 
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Based on these disputed facts - which strike fatally at the heart of MSI/Alta's 
cross-motion — summary judgment was improvidently granted to MSI/Alta. In the event 
this Court does not reverse the denial of summary judgment to The View, the Court 
should nevertheless reverse the grant of summary judgment to MSI/Alta and remand the 
case for further proceedings on this disputed record. See Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 824-25 
(cross-motions determined independently); see also Judkins v. Toone, 492 P.2d 980, 982 
(Utah 1972) (presumptive validity of recitals in deeds created issue of fact precluding 
summary judgment and requiring reversal and remand for trial); State v. Martin, 2002 UT 
345 |^ 34? 44 p.3d 805, 812 (jury is exclusive judge of witness's credibility). 
2. Under this Court's Precedents, Summary Judgment Should Not 
Have Been Granted to MSI/Alta. 
The court of appeals misapprehended or misapplied several of this Court's key 
precedents. This Court should correct that error. 
a. The court of appeals incorrectly applied Flying Diamond. 
This Court held in Flying Diamond that the language of a covenant is "usually 
dispositive" of the intent issue. 776 P.2d at 627. Although the court of appeals 
acknowledged the Flying Diamond decision, it inexplicably seized on the word "usually" 
in concluding that this express language was not dispositive of the issue in favor of The 
View - and not even sufficient to avoid summary judgment against The View! This, too, 
when the language providing that the covenant runs with the land is plain and 
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unambiguous and was never amended as provided by the Declaration itself. The court of 
appeals' decision directly conflicts with the Flying Diamond rule. 
This Court noted further in Flying Diamond that "[t]he parties' intent may also be 
implied by the nature of the covenant itself." 776 P.2d at 627. This Court cited as 
support four cases from other jurisdictions. See id. In each of the four cited cases, the 
guiding principle was that a covenant may run with the land even where the language of 
the agreement itself does not expressly so state.10 None of those cases, and no reported 
Utah case located by counsel for The View, holds that language expressly stating that a 
covenant runs with the land may be ignored on summary judgment based solely on 
conflicting testimony that the parties intended the contrary. That idea turns the statute of 
frauds and land use law on its head. The court of appeals purports to create a new, 
unsubstantiated rule that cannot be squared with this Court's prior rulings. 
10
 See Pedro v. County of Humboldt, 217 Cal. 493, 497, 19 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1933) ("[A]s in 
the case involving the benefit of a covenant running with the land . . . technical words 
should not be necessary to show an intent that the benefit is transferable, if that intent can 
be shown by the nature and subject matter of the agreement "); Brendonwood 
Common v. Franklin, 403 N.E. 2d 1136, 1141 (Ind. App. 1980) (affirming trial court's 
conclusion that parties intended covenants to run with the land where the "deed explicitly 
expresses that they shall run and bind all subsequent grantees"); Levy v. Graham, 347 So. 
2d 1180, 1182 (La. App. 1977) (holding that trial court correctly concluded restrictions 
ran with the land despite absence of technical language so stating); Reichert v. Weeden, 
190 Mont. 95, 99, 618 P.2d 1216 (Mont. 1980) (holding that negative easement ran with 
the land despite failure to use specific language because intent of parties was clear). 
iminQx, q 
^n 
b. The court of appeals improperly analyzed the ambiguity 
issue and misapplied the parol evidence rule. 
The court of appeals undertook an analysis that is at odds with the district court's 
own analysis, the arguments of both parties, and the prior decisions of this Court. Both 
sides agree the language of the Restrictive Covenants is unambiguous. (MSI/Alta Br. at 
30.) Moreover, the court of appeals acknowledged the written provisions clearly 
providing the Restrictive Covenants would run with the land. (Ct. App. Op. ^[2.) 
Notwithstanding these facts, the court found the parties5 intent on this point to be 
"ambiguous" and resorted to extrinsic evidence. (Ct. App. Op. fflj 20-23.) In doing so, 
the court rejected The View's position, which was the sole analysis under which "the 
various provisions of the contract would ostensibly be harmonized." (Ct. App. Op. ^ | 
20-23.) The court of appeals then chose an interpretation of the Restrictive Covenants 
that negates the effect of the plain language of the Restrictive Covenants and discounts 
record evidence from The View. Notably, the court of appeals purported to resolve these 
significant factual disparities "as a matter of law." (Ct. App. Op. ]f 25). 
The court of appeals inexplicably suggested The View's record evidence did not 
support its position that the parties intended to create a covenant running with the land. 
(Ct. App. Op. Tf 26.) Besides the very evidence this Court has held is "usually 
dispositive" of the issue (express contractual language creating a covenant running with 
the land), the record also contains other substantial evidence this Court has said precludes 
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the type of judgment entered here. See supra part I.B.I (identifying disputed record 
evidence). 
The court of appeals9 decision directly conflicts with the analysis set forth by this 
Court in Swenson v. Erickson, supra. Swenson held: 
Generally, unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as 
written. However, where restrictive covenants are susceptible to two or 
more reasonable interpretations, the intention of the parties is controlling. 
Id, 2000 UT 16, If 11, 998 P.2d at 810-11. The court of appeals quoted this language, 
and no more, before turning to extrinsic evidence. (Ct. App. Op. ^ [ 24-26.) However, 
the court of appeals ignored this Court's directive in the very next line in Swenson: 
The intention of the parties is ascertained from the document itself 
and the language used within the document. 
Id. (emphasis added). By ignoring this Court's express directive, the court also ignored 
The View's evidence and ruled against The View as a matter of law. (Ct. App. Op. *[{ 26.) 
This was contrary to this Court's consistent mandates: 
• "When ambiguity exists, the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact." 
SMEIndustries, Inc. v. Thompson, Bentulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 
54,1f 14, 28 P.3d 669, 675. 
• "[W]hen ambiguity exists [in a contract], the intent of the parties becomes a 
question of fact." WebBankv. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f^ 
19, 54 P.3d 1139, 1145. 
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• "If the evidence as to the terms of an agreement is in conflict, the intent of the 
parties as to the terms of the agreement is to be determined by the jury.55 Colonial 
Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 488 
(Utah 1986). 
• "[Ajmbiguity in a written instrument in and of itself may make summary judgment 
inappropriate.55 Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 
1981). 
• See also Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assn., 907 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1995) 
(reversing grant of summary judgment). 
The court of appeals5 decision also conflicts with this Court's holding in Dansie, 
1999 UT 62, 987 P.2d 30. Contrary to Dansie, the court of appeals purported to override 
the plain language of the Restrictive Covenants with mere testimony from a third party 
not expressed in written form. (Ct. App. Opp. ^ 26.) Even if the testimony relied on by 
MSI/Alta in this appeal were admissible, it merely "constitutes evidence" for the trier of 
fact; it does not form the basis for summary judgment. See Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 
UT 16, U 21, 998 P.2d 807, 813. A finder of fact may well reject self-serving testimony 
given in exchange for a release of fraud claims, an evidentiary reality well established in 
this Court's jurisprudence. See, e.g., Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Utah 1996) 
(trier of fact "entitled to weigh the evidence and reject all or part of any witness's 
testimony55). The conclusion allowing contradictory parol evidence to vary the terms of 
an agreement should be reversed. 
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c. The court of appeals weighed evidence and failed to 
harmonize the provisions of the Restrictive Covenants, 
The court of appeals also ignored a fundamental principle governing its standard 
of review: the court must "accept the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to 
the losing party." Winegar v. Froerer Corp,, 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). In fact, the 
court of appeals concluded that The View's evidence had no "probative impact" - an 
assignment of weight wholly inconsistent with this Court's mandate to view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the losing party. (Ct. App. Op. f 26.) The court of appeals 
gave no weight to the evidence presented by The View. (Ct. App. Op. f 26.) Moreover, 
the court of appeals, on summary judgment, undid a Restrictive Covenant that can only 
be set aside by "clear and convincing evidence" - a standard the court below did not even 
acknowledge or discuss, let alone demonstrate was met. See Leaver v. Grose, 563 P.2d 
773, 775 (Utah 1977). 
The court of appeals' analysis would effect a fundamental change in how Utah 
courts resolve the question of whether a covenant runs with the land. Under the court of 
appeals' approach, the language of the contract itself can be rendered irrelevant by a 
court on summary judgment. Such a rule runs contrary to this Court's jurisprudence. 
Even when a court concludes that a contract is ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence 
may therefore be considered, the language of the contract itself provides probative 
evidence - perhaps the most compelling evidence - of the parties' intent. See, e.g., 
Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, f 25, 48 P.3d 918 (upholding denial of 
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summary judgment, concluding that in "[v]iewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the defendants, a factfinder could find, based on the language of the 
agreement and the requirements in existence in 1976, that the contract did not waive all 
of the director requirements" (emphasis added)). 
This Court has made clear that "the process of resolving ambiguities will 
sometimes require the consideration of evidence, and conflicts in evidence will need to be 
resolved by the trier of fact." Morris v. Mountain States Tel & Tel Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 
1201 (Utah 1983). Thus, summary judgment would have been appropriate only if there 
were no "conflicts in evidence" regarding the parties' intent. Here, if the concept of 
ambiguity is accepted (a proposition with which both sides disagree), there clearly was 
such a conflict. 
The court below also ignored the governing rule of construction that all provisions 
of a contract must be harmonized. In identifying what the court of appeals called "three 
different, equally plausible readings" of the Restrictive Covenants (in an analysis not 
suggested by either party or by the district court), the court of appeals determined that 
only The View's analysis purported to harmonize the various provisions of the contract. 
(Ct. App. Op. Tflf 20-23.) The requirement of harmonizing contract provisions is 
hornbook law recognized by this Court and by the court of appeals, but not followed in 
this case. See, e.g., Central Florida Investments v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, % 12, 
40 P.3d 599, 605; Orlob v. Wasatch Management, 2001 UT App. 287,114, 33 P.3d 
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1078, 1081. The effect is to deprive The View of a restrictive covenant expressly 
incorporated into its deed. (R. 417-18.) 
In sum, the court of appeals ignored or departed from this Court's firmly 
established precedents. This Court should correct that error with a reversal. 
C. MSI/Alta's Arguments Are Unavailing11 
The legal and factual arguments advanced by MSI/Alta are unpersuasive. The 
View will address each in turn. 
1. MSI/Alta's Case Law Serves Primarily to Support The View's 
Position. 
The case law cited by MSI/Alta strongly supports The View's position. Citing 
Rosiv. McCoy, 356 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. 1987), and DyegardLand Partnership v. Hoover, 
39 S.W.3d 300, 313-15 (Tex. App. 2001), MSI/Alta argues that courts uniformly uphold 
a developer's retained authority to "amend restrictive covenants." (MSI/Alta Opening 
Br. at 27.) In both cases, the developers did just that - amended the restrictive covenants. 
11
 As the Court knows, MSI/Alta preemptively took the first cut at The View's appeal 
issue in its opening brief, to which The View objected in a motion to strike. This Court 
allowed the practice in a perfunctory order denying the motion. (Order dated Jan. 5, 
2005.) The View continues to maintain that this practice is unprecedented, unfair, and 
unsupportable under the governing rules. See Utah R. App. P. 24(g), 51(b)(4). The result 
in this case is that MSI/Alta gets two chances rather than one - including the first chance 
- to brief the restrictive covenant issue as respondent. Moreover, The View as petitioner 
is inexplicably required to respond defensively to its own appeal issue in its opening 
brief. In resolving the merits of this appeal, the Court should provide guidance to 
practitioners on this point in a published decision. If MSI/Alta's practice is allowed to 
stand, it will become the standard in briefing cross-appeals and negatively distinguish 
Utah's appellate practice from that of virtually any other jurisdiction, state or federal, of 
which counsel is aware. The View reserves all rights to reply to any of MSI/Alta's 
arguments on the restrictive covenant issue in its final reply brief. 
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That is precisely what was not done in the instant case. Moreover, in both cases, the 
governing documents had broad provisions allowing the developers to unilaterally amend 
the covenants in any way. Here, in contrast, the developer's retained unilateral right is 
more limited, applying to changes in density, size, shape, and location. (Add. 36, 79; R. 
369,412.) 
Next, MSI/Alta argues, citing Richards v. Abbottsford Homeowners Ass'n, 809 
S.W.2d 193 (Tenn. App. 1990), that "a declaration of covenants should be interpreted in 
connection with the most recent amended plat." (MSI/Alta Opening Br. at 27.) The 
View could not agree more. This Court should read the language of the Restrictive 
Covenants and apply it to the most recent Amended Plat. This is required by the 
Restrictive Covenants themselves and by the very case law cited by MSI/Alta. 
MSI/Alta also cites Matthews v. Kernewood, Inc., 40 A.2d 522 (Md. 1945), and 
Brown v. McDavid, 676 P.2d 714, 718 (Colo. App. 1983), for the proposition that 
"restrictive covenants may be amended by the recording of an amended plat." (MSI/Alta 
Opening Br. at 28-29.) Those cases reach exactly the opposite conclusion. Matthews 
held that an implied covenant did not arise from the mere filing of an amended plat. 40 
A.2d at 524-25. And in McDavid, a "Termination Document" was filed expressly 
terminating the restrictive covenants pursuant to the terms of those covenants. 676 P.2d 
at 718. No such document was filed in the instant case. 
Finally, MSI/Alta argues The View "abandoned" any covenant b y not claiming it 
before this litigation. (MSI/Alta Opening Br. at 29.) MSI/Alta cites as support this 
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Court's decision in Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16, 998 P.2d 807. (MSI/Alta Opening 
Br. at 30.) The abandonment rule in Swenson derives directly from Fink v. Miller, 896 
P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1995). See 2000 UT 16, % 27, 998 P.2d at 814. It focuses on 
repeated and substantial violations of a covenant as the touchstone for abandonment: 
• 'The case law is uniform that before an abandonment of a covenant may be 
found there must be 'substantial and general5 noncompliance with the 
covenant." Id. If 22, at 813. 
• A covenant must be "habitually and substantially violated." Id. 
• "The violations must be so substantial as to destroy the usefulness of the 
covenant and support a finding that the covenant has become burdensome." 
Id. 
• "If the original purpose of the covenant can still be accomplished and 
substantial benefit will continue to inure to residents, the covenant will 
stand." Id. 
• "Evidence of abandonment must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence." Id. 
• Where "the contemplated benefits to the plaintiff still exist," the covenant 
"has neither ceased nor become useless." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 
Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assocs., 535 
P.2d 1256, 1261 (Utah 1975)). 
In Fink, the court affirmed summary judgment declining to enforce a restrictive 
shingling covenant when 23 of 81 houses in the subdivision had violated the covenant 
without retributive enforcement. See 896 P.2d at 653-54. The Court held that, as a 
matter of law, the "violations are so great as to lead the mind of the average [person] to 
reasonably conclude that the restriction in question has been abandoned." Id. at 653 
(internal quotations omitted). No evidence of repeated covenant violations, let alone of a 
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clear and convincing nature, appears in the summary judgment record here. Nothing in 
the record exists to show the parking covenant had ever been "violated" because Lot 5 
had never previously been developed. Moreover, the contemplated parking benefits to 
the plaintiff still clearly exist. 
The "abandonment" argument is also contradicted by the express terms of the 
Restrictive Covenants, which provide that "[fjailure by . . . any Owner or Maintenance 
Association^ to enforce any covenant or restriction herein contained shall in no event be 
deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter." (Add. 58 § 7.1; R. 391.) The 
conclusion that a party has given up rights in the face of a contradictory express 
reservation of rights can hardly be sustained on summary judgment against the party 
reserving its rights. See, e.g., Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah App. 
1995) (noting this is a "highly fact-dependent question," especially given existence of 
express non-waiver provision in contract). 
Covenants running with the land generally have an indefinite life. See, e.g., 
Thayer v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 787, 789 (Wash. App. 1984). In this case, the restrictive 
parking covenant on Lot 5 has a specifically articulated life of 50 years. (Add. 79 § 
12.12.) The dormancy of the need to invoke the Restrictive Covenants does not affect its 
enforceability.12 Thus, it is immaterial that this Covenant was not previously at issue. 
Restrictive Covenants would be useless if, by the mere passage of time, they could not be 
12
 MSI/Alta likewise waited until this litigation to argue that The View's rights on Lot 9 
had terminated. (R. 523.) 
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enforced the first time they were put to the test. The View's need for parking is no less 
important because of its futurity, and its rights were not threatened until the MSI/Alta 
development plan was struck in contravention of the Restrictive Covenants. Under these 
circumstances, the argument that a finding of "abandonment" is appropriate on summary 
judgment is not well taken. 
2. MSI/Alta's Main Arguments Are Factual In Nature. 
Besides its legal arguments, MSI/Alta advances several factual arguments in 
support of its position. First, MSI/Alta argues that "one of the purposes" of the Amended 
Plat was to eliminate a central parking facility. Second, MSI/Alta argues that no 
"dwelling units" were apportioned for Lot 5 on the original Plat. Third, MSI/Alta argues 
Lot 5 is not contiguous to Lot 8 on the Amended Plat. (MSI/Alta Opening Br. at 27.) 
None of these fact-intensive arguments is persuasive on summary judgment. 
First, the sole support for the central parking argument is the testimony of Walter 
Plumb. (MSI/Alta Opening Br. at 27.) His testimony conflicts with the Restrictive 
Covenants themselves and runs counter to this Court's clear holding in Flying Diamond 
that the parties' subjective intent is irrelevant when construing a covenant running with 
the land. 
Second, that no "dwelling units" were originally apportioned for Lot 5 is 
irrelevant. The Restrictive Covenants provided for parking in favor of Lot 8 with other 
rights on the same land reserved to Sorenson. The change from anticipated commercial 
to residential building does nothing to affect the parking covenant in favor of Lot 8 and is 
fully consistent with the Restrictive Covenants. 
Third, Lot 8 is directly adjacent to Lot 5, separated only by a small road in a 
relatively small mountain subdivision. It is convenient parking for The View. A jury can 
consider these arguments and counterarguments. They are factual in nature. 
In sum, MSI/Alta's arguments avail them nothing. For all the reasons set forth 
herein, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' erroneous restrictive covenant 
decision with respect to Lot 5. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT MATERIAL 
FACT DISPUTES EXIST ON WHETHER ALTA'S TERMINATION OF 
THE VIEW'S SNOW STORAGE RIGHTS ON LOT 9 CONSTITUTED A 
TAKING BY ALTA WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION. 
It was proper for the court of appeals to overturn the lower court's dismissal of 
The View's takings claim. Under the Utah Constitution, private property cannot be taken 
or damaged for public use without just compensation. Utah Const, art. I, § 22. 
Analyzing whether a taking has occurred requires two steps: "[T]he claimant must 
demonstrate 'some protectable interest in property.' If the claimant possesses a 
protectable property interest, the claimant must then show that the interest has been 
'taken or damaged' by government action." Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork 
City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996) (internal citations omitted). The court of appeals 
correctly recognized that The View has evidence to meet each of these elements. 
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A. Remand Issues that Are Not Part of this Appeal Are Sufficient in and 
of Themselves to Establish that The View Has a Protectable Property 
Interest in Snow Storage on Lot 9. 
The Utah appellate courts have found a broad range of property interests subject to 
the takings provision of the Utah Constitution. These property interests include express 
or implied easements, Hampton v. State Road Comm V?, 445 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1968); 
leases, Colman v. Utah State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990); rights to light and 
air, Utah State Road Comm n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1974); and rights of 
access, Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Utah App. 1988). Based 
on this case law and the facts in this case, The View has evidence to demonstrate a 
protectable property interest in storing snow on Lot 9. 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of The 
View's claim for a snow storage easement on Lot 9. (Ct. App. Op. fflj 35-36.) That 
decision is not subject to review in this limited grant of certiorari. (Add. 1.) An 
easement in land is an interest protected by the takings clause of the Utah Constitution. 
See Hampton, 445 P.2d at 710. Easements "which are open and plain to be seen and are 
reasonably necessary ... pass as appurtenances to the land." Id. at 710. A party "can 
place no reliance on the fact that an easement appurtenant is not specifically contained 
within the property's legal description." Id. If The View establishes at trial that it has an 
easement for snow storage across Lot 9, The View has established a protectable property 
interest in Lot 9, a fortiori. Thus, the View's evidence on remand is legally sufficient to 
demonstrate that The View has a protectable property right. 
The court of appeals also remanded for a trial on The View's claim that MSI/Alta 
is estopped from denying the existence of The View's snow storage rights on Lot 9. (Ct. 
App. Op. fflf 35-36.) Again, that decision is not at issue here. Alta previously and 
strenuously argued that The View had snow storage rights in Lot 9 appurtenant to its use 
of Lot 8. The record evidence shows that in 1999, Alta took the following position: 
Lot 9 was designated and given up as snow removal and snow storage in 
order for The View ... to be completed. That still stands. It has never been 
recorded, but it is part of a conditional use permit that allowed building 
permits that allowed the construction of those buildings. It is in open 
record. It is in the Planning Commission's documents. 
(R. 510). Other similar evidence appears of record in which Alta itself repeatedly 
contended that The View had such an established right. (R. 517-18, 536, 538, 541.) 
The View has reasonably acted for more than 15 years on representations that it 
had a continuing right to store snow on Lot 9. The court of appeals thought there was 
"no dispute as to the View's property interest in the continued use and development of 
Lot 8, thus satisfying the first prong of the takings analysis." (Ct. App. Op. Tf 36). A 
constitutionally protected use of an owner's interest in property may be as broad as "the 
beneficial use of its property in general." Diamond B-Y Ranches v. Tooele County, 2004 
UT App 135, f 18, 91 P.3d 841, 847. In Diamond B-Y Ranches, the court held just such 
an interest rendered summary judgment inappropriate based on a protectable interest. Id. 
Again, if The View can successfully establish its estoppel claim for snow storage on Lot 
9, it will have established a protectable property interest in Lot 9. 
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This Court should affirm the court of appeals' takings decision and remand the 
case for determination of that claim in conjunction with the other pending claims. "Trial 
courts are in a much better position to evaluate an entire case ... [w]here, as in this case, 
all possible ramifications of a decision on appeal may not be readily apparent, a case will 
be remanded for such proceedings as are appropriate in view of the guidance offered in 
the opinion." Three D Corp., 752 P.2d at 1326. On remand, The View has the 
opportunity of presenting evidence to the trial court that (a) it has an easement for snow 
storage on Lot 9; and/or (b) that Alta is estopped from depriving The View of its right to 
continued snow storage on Lot 9. In the event the trial court rules in favor of The View 
on either or both of these open issues, The View will have established a protectable 
property interest in Lot 9. See also Three D Corp., 752 P.2d at 1323. 
B. The View's Protectable Property Interest in the Use of Lot 9 for Snow 
Storage Has Been Damaged by Alta's Action. 
"[T]o bring the case within the damage clause of the constitution, there must be 
some physical interference with the property itself or with some easement which 
constitutes an appurtenance thereto . . . . " Colman v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d at 
622, 626 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added). The question of whether The View has a valid 
easement is based on disputed issues of fact that will be decided by the district court on 
remand and which are not at issue in this appeal. If The View had an easement, that 
easement has been lost in its totality by Alta's actions. 
A taking is defined as any "substantial interference with private property which 
destroys or materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to use and 
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." Colman, 795 P.2d at 626 
(quoting State ex rel. State Road Comm 'n v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 
P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1937)). If the governmental action "substantially impairs a right 
appurtenant to an owner's property, or otherwise causes peculiar injury, ... the owner is 
entitled to compensation." Three D Corp., 752 P.2d at 1326. 
Various types of injuries have been found to constitute such damage requiring 
compensation by the Utah Constitution, including such things as "preventing surface 
waters from running off adjacent lands or running surface waters onto adjacent lands." 
Board ofEduc. of Logan CitySch. Dist. v. Croft, 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1962); 
Colman, 795 P.2d at 626 (identifying examples). Damage caused to land by allowing (or 
not allowing) drainage between contiguous properties is closely analogous to allowing 
(or not allowing) snow to be moved between adjacent properties. Not allowing The View 
to continue its long-standing, established practice of storing snow on Lot 9 is the type of 
damage this Court described in the lists of examples set forth in its prior cases. 
"[T]he precise limits of a taking or damaging have yet to be carefully or 
consistently spelled out by this court." Colman, 795 P.2d. at 637 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring). Nevertheless, the cases establish three basic principles. 
If the governmental action "1) . . . effectively deprives a property owner of 
reasonable access to property, the owner is entitled to compensation- 2) 
merely interferes with an owner's access to property, the owner is not 
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entitled to compensation so long as the owner still has reasonable access; 3) 
... substantially impairs a right appurteuant to an owner's property, or 
otherwise causes peculiar injury, and thereby results in substantial 
devaluation, the owner is entitled to compensation." 
Three D Corp., 752 P.2d at 1325-26 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original) 
(concluding that, even though no physical taking occurred, by altering property access 
which then reduced available parking stalls, owner was damaged and entitled to just 
compensation). 
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to The View, shows the loss of a 
snow storage easement and related rights of access. This is a taking that requires just 
compensation even if other, more expensive options may be available to The View at 
other locations. The proceedings have not yet progressed to the point of valuing the loss, 
but they will on remand. Because Alta's actions preclude any use of Lot 9 by The View, 
the fact of damages is certain even if the amount is not yet established. (See also R. 541-
42) (threatening The View with loss of its right to use its property (i.e., Lot 8) at all). 
In sum, the View has a protectable property right to snow storage on Lot 9. That 
property right will be damaged or destroyed if The View is precluded from continuing to 
store snow on Lot 9, as has been the case for more than 15 years. This court should 
affirm the court of appeals' remand of this matter to the district court for a trial on the 
merits. 
^mino*, i 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those that appear further of record, this Court 
should reverse the court of appeals' ruling affirming summary judgment against The 
View on the restrictive parking covenant issue. The covenant runs in The View's favor, 
was not terminated by mere plat amendment, and is enforceable at law. Furthermore, the 
Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision reversing and remanding to the district 
court for a trial on the merits of The View's takings claim. 
DATED this g W ""day of January, 2005. 
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